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Full Idea
Dummett's best argument for excluding abstract nouns relies upon the entirely Fregean requirement that with any genuine singular term there must be associated a criterion of identity.
Gist of Idea
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns
Source
report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II
Book Ref
Hale,Bob: 'Abstract Objects' [Blackwell 1987], p.36
A Reaction
This sounds a rather rigid test. Must the criteria be logically precise, or must you just have some vague idea of what you are talking about?
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| 18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |