more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 10329

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony ]

Full Idea

How can we hope to reduce testimony to perception if the way we perceive the world is to a considerable extent shaped by concepts and categories that we have learned from others?

Gist of Idea

Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories

Source

Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4)

Book Ref

Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.32

A Reaction

To me this sounds like good support for coherentism, the benign circle between my reason, my experience, and the testimony and reason of others. Asking how the circle could get started shows ignorance of biology.

The 28 ideas from 'Knowledge by Agreement'

10325 Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
10324 Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
10323 Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
10327 Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
10329 Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
10332 Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]
10331 Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
10330 A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
10333 Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
10334 Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
10336 Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
10335 Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
10337 We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
10339 Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
10341 Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
10338 The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
10340 Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
10343 Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
10344 Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
10345 Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
10350 Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
10351 Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
10348 Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
10349 To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
10353 Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
10354 Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
10358 Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
10357 Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]