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Single Idea 10330
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
]
Full Idea
It can be argued that testimony is non-reductive because it relies on the fact that whatever is intelligible is likely to come from a rational source, and that rational sources, by their very nature, tend towards the truth.
Gist of Idea
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
Source
Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4 n7)
Book Ref
Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.37
A Reaction
[He cites Tyler Burge 1993, 1997] If this makes testimony non-reductive, how would one assess whether the testimony is 'intelligible'?
The
28 ideas
from Martin Kusch
10325
|
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
[Kusch]
|
10324
|
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10323
|
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
[Kusch]
|
10332
|
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
[Kusch]
|
10327
|
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
[Kusch]
|
10329
|
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
[Kusch]
|
10331
|
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10330
|
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
[Kusch]
|
10335
|
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
[Kusch]
|
10334
|
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
[Kusch]
|
10337
|
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10336
|
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
[Kusch]
|
10333
|
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
[Kusch]
|
10339
|
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
|
10338
|
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10341
|
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
[Kusch]
|
10340
|
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
|
10343
|
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
[Kusch]
|
10344
|
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
|
10345
|
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|
10351
|
Natural kinds are social institutions
[Kusch]
|
10348
|
Private justification is justification to imagined other people
[Kusch]
|
10349
|
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
[Kusch]
|
10353
|
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
[Kusch]
|
10354
|
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
[Kusch]
|
10358
|
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
[Kusch]
|
10357
|
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
[Kusch]
|