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Single Idea 10337
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
]
Full Idea
We can have knowledge that p without believing that p. It is enough that others credit us with the knowledge.
Gist of Idea
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
Source
Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.55
A Reaction
[He is discussing Welbourne 1993] This is an extreme of the communitarian view.
The
28 ideas
from Martin Kusch
10325
|
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
[Kusch]
|
10324
|
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10323
|
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
[Kusch]
|
10332
|
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
[Kusch]
|
10327
|
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
[Kusch]
|
10329
|
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
[Kusch]
|
10331
|
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10330
|
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
[Kusch]
|
10335
|
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
[Kusch]
|
10334
|
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
[Kusch]
|
10337
|
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10336
|
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
[Kusch]
|
10333
|
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
[Kusch]
|
10339
|
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
|
10338
|
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10341
|
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
[Kusch]
|
10340
|
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
|
10343
|
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
[Kusch]
|
10344
|
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
|
10345
|
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|
10351
|
Natural kinds are social institutions
[Kusch]
|
10348
|
Private justification is justification to imagined other people
[Kusch]
|
10349
|
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
[Kusch]
|
10353
|
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
[Kusch]
|
10354
|
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
[Kusch]
|
10358
|
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
[Kusch]
|
10357
|
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
[Kusch]
|