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Single Idea 10343
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
]
Full Idea
Process reliabilism is sometimes subsumed under the label 'virtue epistemology', so that processes are 'epistemically virtuous' if they lead mostly to true beliefs. The 'intellectual virtues' here are perception, memory or reasoning.
Gist of Idea
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
Source
Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.107
A Reaction
I am shocked that 'intellectual virtue' should be hijacked by reliabilists, suggesting that it even applies to a good clock. I like the Aristotelian idea that sound knowledge rests on qualities of character in the knower - including social qualities.
The
28 ideas
from Martin Kusch
10325
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Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
[Kusch]
|
10324
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Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10323
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Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
[Kusch]
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10327
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Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
[Kusch]
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10329
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Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
[Kusch]
|
10332
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Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
[Kusch]
|
10331
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Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10330
|
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
[Kusch]
|
10333
|
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
[Kusch]
|
10334
|
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
[Kusch]
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10336
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Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
[Kusch]
|
10335
|
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
[Kusch]
|
10337
|
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10339
|
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
|
10341
|
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
[Kusch]
|
10338
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The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10340
|
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
|
10343
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Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
[Kusch]
|
10344
|
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
|
10345
|
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|
10351
|
Natural kinds are social institutions
[Kusch]
|
10348
|
Private justification is justification to imagined other people
[Kusch]
|
10349
|
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
[Kusch]
|
10353
|
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
[Kusch]
|
10354
|
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
[Kusch]
|
10358
|
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
[Kusch]
|
10357
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Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
[Kusch]
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