more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 10344
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
]
Full Idea
I am unconvinced by McDowell's arguments in favour of treating the world as itself conceptual. Granted that our experience is conceptual in quality; it still does not follow that the world itself is conceptual.
Gist of Idea
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
Source
Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.112
A Reaction
I would take Kusch's point to be a given in any discussion of concepts, and McDowell as a non-starter on this one. I am inclined to believe that we do have non-conceptual experiences, but I take them to be epistemologically useless.
The
28 ideas
from 'Knowledge by Agreement'
10325
|
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
[Kusch]
|
10324
|
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10323
|
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
[Kusch]
|
10332
|
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
[Kusch]
|
10327
|
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
[Kusch]
|
10329
|
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
[Kusch]
|
10331
|
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10330
|
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
[Kusch]
|
10335
|
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
[Kusch]
|
10334
|
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
[Kusch]
|
10337
|
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
[Kusch]
|
10336
|
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
[Kusch]
|
10333
|
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
[Kusch]
|
10339
|
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
|
10338
|
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10341
|
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
[Kusch]
|
10340
|
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
|
10343
|
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
[Kusch]
|
10344
|
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
|
10345
|
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|
10351
|
Natural kinds are social institutions
[Kusch]
|
10348
|
Private justification is justification to imagined other people
[Kusch]
|
10349
|
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
[Kusch]
|
10353
|
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
[Kusch]
|
10354
|
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
[Kusch]
|
10358
|
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
[Kusch]
|
10357
|
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
[Kusch]
|