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Single Idea 10350
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
]
Full Idea
Assessments of causal routes are specific to cultures, and thus not beyond dialectical justification.
Gist of Idea
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
Source
Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.11)
Book Ref
Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.161
A Reaction
This is a good defence of the social and communitarian view against those who are trying to be thoroughly naturalistic and physicalist by relying entirely on causal processes for all explanation, even though I sympathise with such naturalism.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:
11052
|
Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief
[Frege]
|
3790
|
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents
[Wittgenstein]
|
3832
|
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
|
8798
|
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification
[Sosa]
|
16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
3795
|
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
[Dennett]
|
2746
|
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
[Dancy,J]
|
2747
|
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
[Dancy,J]
|
3569
|
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
|
3567
|
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
|
3586
|
Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
|
3898
|
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
[Scruton]
|
6358
|
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
10350
|
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
[Kusch]
|