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Single Idea 10360

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata ]

Full Idea

The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.

Gist of Idea

Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2

A Reaction

An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.

The 41 ideas with the same theme [categories of item connected by causation]:

8344 At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
14560 A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant]
10370 Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J]
3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
10363 Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
4784 Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
8411 Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
15485 Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
15491 Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
8342 Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
8542 If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
4785 Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
7853 Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau]
7857 Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
4076 Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
8317 To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
4209 The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
4215 It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
4790 If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
20083 Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
23787 If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
14533 Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
14558 A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
14559 Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
14565 Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
22639 Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
22615 One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
22616 Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
22617 Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
22619 Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]