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Single Idea 10360
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
The standard view make causal relata events (Davidson, Kim, Lewis), but there is considerable support for facts (Bennett, Mellor), and occasional support for features (Dretske), tropes (Campbell), states of affairs (Armstrong), and situations and aspects.
Gist of Idea
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2
A Reaction
An event is presumed to be concrete, while a fact is more abstract (a proposition, perhaps). I'm always drawn to 'processes' (because they are good for discussing the mind), so an event, as a sort of natural process, looks good.
The
27 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Causation'
10359
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In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
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10361
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Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
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10360
|
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
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10362
|
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
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10367
|
There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
|
10366
|
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
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10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
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10368
|
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
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10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
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10373
|
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
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10375
|
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
|
10376
|
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
|
10377
|
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
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10378
|
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
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10382
|
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
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10380
|
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
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10385
|
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
|
10387
|
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
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10388
|
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
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10384
|
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10386
|
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
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10381
|
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10389
|
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
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10390
|
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
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10393
|
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
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10394
|
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]
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