more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 10362
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
The view that there are two causal relata is widely assumed but seldom defended. But the account based on 'effectual difference' says the form is 'c causes e rather than e*'. One might defend four relata, in 'c rather than c* causes e rather than e*'.
Gist of Idea
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.3
A Reaction
[compressed] This doesn't sound very plausible to me. How do you decide which is e*? If I lob a brick into the crowd, it hits Jim rather than - who?
The
27 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Causation'
10359
|
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
|
10361
|
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
|
10360
|
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
|
10362
|
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
|
10367
|
There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
|
10366
|
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
|
10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
|
10368
|
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
|
10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
|
10373
|
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
|
10375
|
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
|
10376
|
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
|
10377
|
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
|
10378
|
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
|
10382
|
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
|
10384
|
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
|
10386
|
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
|
10380
|
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
|
10385
|
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
|
10387
|
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
|
10388
|
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
|
10381
|
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
|
10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
|
10389
|
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
|
10390
|
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
|
10393
|
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
|
10394
|
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]
|