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Full Idea
Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
Gist of Idea
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts
Source
report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.5
A Reaction
The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.
| 10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
| 4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
| 8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |