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Single Idea 10367
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
]
Full Idea
It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True.
Gist of Idea
There is only one fact - the True
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.6
A Reaction
[he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa.
The
54 ideas
from Jonathan Schaffer
14599
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Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality)
[Schaffer,J]
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14600
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Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions
[Schaffer,J]
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14601
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Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one
[Schaffer,J]
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14603
|
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing
[Schaffer,J]
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14604
|
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science
[Schaffer,J]
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14605
|
Tropes are the same as events
[Schaffer,J]
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14606
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Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible
[Schaffer,J]
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14607
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T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood
[Schaffer,J]
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14081
|
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
[Schaffer,J]
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14082
|
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
[Schaffer,J]
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17304
|
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels
[Schaffer,J]
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17306
|
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure
[Schaffer,J]
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17305
|
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields
[Schaffer,J]
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17307
|
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges
[Schaffer,J]
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17308
|
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast
[Schaffer,J]
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10359
|
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
|
10361
|
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
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10360
|
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
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10362
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One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
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10366
|
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
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10367
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There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
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10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
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10368
|
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
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10375
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At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
|
10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
|
10373
|
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
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10376
|
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
|
10377
|
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
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10378
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A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
|
10382
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Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10381
|
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
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10380
|
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
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10385
|
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10387
|
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
|
10388
|
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
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10384
|
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10386
|
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
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10389
|
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
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10390
|
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
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10393
|
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
|
10394
|
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]
|
13734
|
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding
[Schaffer,J]
|
13739
|
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances
[Schaffer,J]
|
13743
|
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like
[Schaffer,J]
|
13741
|
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers'
[Schaffer,J]
|
13744
|
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction
[Schaffer,J]
|
13740
|
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument
[Schaffer,J]
|
13742
|
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way
[Schaffer,J]
|
13747
|
Supervenience is just modal correlation
[Schaffer,J]
|
13748
|
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics
[Schaffer,J]
|
13751
|
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse
[Schaffer,J]
|
13749
|
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism
[Schaffer,J]
|
13752
|
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
[Schaffer,J]
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