more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 10368
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
Gist of Idea
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
The
41 ideas
with the same theme
[categories of item connected by causation]:
8344
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events
[Hume, by Davidson]
14560
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
[Kant]
10370
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions
[Quine, by Schaffer,J]
3445
Causation among objects relates either events or states
[Chisholm]
10363
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata
[Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
4784
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation
[Salmon, by Psillos]
8411
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation
[Salmon]
15485
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation
[Martin,CB]
15491
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations
[Martin,CB]
8342
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events
[Kim on Mackie]
10364
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything
[Bennett]
8403
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
[Field,H on Davidson]
8542
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
[Shoemaker]
3524
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
[Davidson, by Maslin]
3526
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
[Davidson, by Maslin]
4785
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express)
[Mellor, by Psillos]
7853
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
7857
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
8517
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
[Campbell,K]
8516
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
[Campbell,K]
4076
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
[Crane]
8317
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
4209
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration
[Lowe]
4215
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers
[Lowe]
4790
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
[Psillos]
20083
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events)
[Stout,R]
10361
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
10360
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
10362
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
10368
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
10383
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
23787
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible
[Williams,NE]
14533
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
[Mumford/Anjum]
14558
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
[Mumford/Anjum]
14559
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
[Mumford/Anjum]
14565
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
[Mumford/Anjum]
22639
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction
[Ingthorsson]
22615
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist
[Ingthorsson]
22616
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions
[Ingthorsson]
22617
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional
[Ingthorsson]
22619
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect
[Ingthorsson]