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Single Idea 10368

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata ]

Full Idea

Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.

Gist of Idea

If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7

A Reaction

Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.

The 54 ideas from Jonathan Schaffer

14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
17304 As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
17306 If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
17305 I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
17307 Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
17308 Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
10367 There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]