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Single Idea 10368
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
Gist of Idea
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
The
27 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Causation'
10359
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
10361
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
10360
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
10362
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
10367
There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
10366
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
10372
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
10368
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
10374
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
10373
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
10375
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
10376
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
10377
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
10378
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
10382
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10383
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
10380
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
10385
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10387
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
10388
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
10384
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10386
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
10381
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10389
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
10390
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
10393
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
10394
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]