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Single Idea 10368
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.
Gist of Idea
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.
The
54 ideas
from Jonathan Schaffer
14599
Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality)
[Schaffer,J]
14600
Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions
[Schaffer,J]
14601
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one
[Schaffer,J]
14603
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing
[Schaffer,J]
14604
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science
[Schaffer,J]
14605
Tropes are the same as events
[Schaffer,J]
14606
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible
[Schaffer,J]
14607
T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood
[Schaffer,J]
14081
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
[Schaffer,J]
14082
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
[Schaffer,J]
17304
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels
[Schaffer,J]
17306
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure
[Schaffer,J]
17305
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields
[Schaffer,J]
17307
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges
[Schaffer,J]
17308
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast
[Schaffer,J]
10359
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
10361
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
10360
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
10362
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
10366
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
10367
There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
10372
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
10368
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
10375
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
10374
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
10373
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
10376
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
10377
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
10378
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
10382
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10381
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10383
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
10380
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
10385
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10387
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
10388
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
10384
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
10386
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
10389
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
10390
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
10393
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
10394
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]
13734
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding
[Schaffer,J]
13739
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances
[Schaffer,J]
13743
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like
[Schaffer,J]
13741
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers'
[Schaffer,J]
13744
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction
[Schaffer,J]
13740
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument
[Schaffer,J]
13742
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way
[Schaffer,J]
13747
Supervenience is just modal correlation
[Schaffer,J]
13748
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics
[Schaffer,J]
13751
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse
[Schaffer,J]
13749
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism
[Schaffer,J]
13752
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
[Schaffer,J]