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Single Idea 10370
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Quine's view is that causal relata are individuated by spacetime regions, which is even less fine-grained than Davidson's account of events.... He says fine-grained events are poorly individuated and unfamiliar.
Gist of Idea
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions
Source
report of Willard Quine (Events and Reification [1985]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
[Schaffer cites Davidson 1985 as accepting this view] This is a nice suggestion, if we are looking for a naturalistic account of causal relata. It makes a minimum ontological commitment (a Quine trait), and I would supplement it with active 'powers'.
The
41 ideas
with the same theme
[categories of item connected by causation]:
8344
|
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events
[Hume, by Davidson]
|
14560
|
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
[Kant]
|
10370
|
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions
[Quine, by Schaffer,J]
|
3445
|
Causation among objects relates either events or states
[Chisholm]
|
10363
|
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata
[Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
|
4784
|
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation
[Salmon, by Psillos]
|
8411
|
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation
[Salmon]
|
15485
|
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation
[Martin,CB]
|
15491
|
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations
[Martin,CB]
|
8342
|
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events
[Kim on Mackie]
|
10364
|
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything
[Bennett]
|
8403
|
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
[Field,H on Davidson]
|
8542
|
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
[Shoemaker]
|
3524
|
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
3526
|
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
4785
|
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express)
[Mellor, by Psillos]
|
7853
|
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
|
7857
|
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
|
8517
|
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
[Campbell,K]
|
8516
|
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
[Campbell,K]
|
4076
|
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
[Crane]
|
8317
|
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
|
4209
|
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration
[Lowe]
|
4215
|
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers
[Lowe]
|
4790
|
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
[Psillos]
|
20083
|
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events)
[Stout,R]
|
10361
|
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
|
10360
|
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
|
10362
|
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
|
10368
|
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
|
10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
|
23787
|
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible
[Williams,NE]
|
14533
|
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14558
|
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14559
|
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14565
|
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
22639
|
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction
[Ingthorsson]
|
22615
|
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist
[Ingthorsson]
|
22616
|
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions
[Ingthorsson]
|
22617
|
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional
[Ingthorsson]
|
22619
|
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect
[Ingthorsson]
|