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Single Idea 10390

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation ]

Full Idea

Reasons for denying that causal order is temporal order are that time travel seems possible, that cause and effect can be simultaneous, because joint effects have temporal order without causal connection, and because backward causation may exist.

Gist of Idea

Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.24

A Reaction

The possibility of time travel and backward causation can clearly be doubted, and certainly can't be grounds for one's whole metaphysics. The other two need careful analysis, but I think they can be answered. Causation is temporal.

The 27 ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Causation'

10359 In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
10361 Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
10360 Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
10362 One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
10367 There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
10366 Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
10372 Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
10368 If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
10374 There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
10373 Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
10375 At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
10376 The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
10377 Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
10378 A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
10382 Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
10383 The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
10380 Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
10385 If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10387 The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
10388 Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
10384 If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
10386 If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
10381 All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
10389 Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
10390 Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]