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Single Idea 10391

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomena and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause.

Gist of Idea

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them

Source

John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.2

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.35

A Reaction

[ref Mill p.196, 1846 edn] Schaffer gives this as the main argument for the 'no-basis' view of the selection of what causes an event. The usual thought is that it is entirely our immediate interests which make us select THE cause. Not convinced.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

10391 Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
14547 The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
22645 Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
8370 A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
8333 A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
15277 The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
14567 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]