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Single Idea 10392

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination.

Gist of Idea

It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause

Source

David Lewis (Causation [1973])

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.162


A Reaction

This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well?


The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]