more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 10392

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination.

Gist of Idea

It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause

Source

David Lewis (Causation [1973])

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.162


A Reaction

This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well?


The 15 ideas from 'Causation'

If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]