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Single Idea 10393

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis.

Gist of Idea

Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.27


A Reaction

The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]