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Single Idea 10400

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Conceptualists urge that words like 'honesty', which might seem to refer to properties, really refer to concepts. A few contemporary philosophers have defended conceptualism, and recent empirical work bears on it, but the view is no longer common.

Gist of Idea

Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 1.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.3

A Reaction

..and that's all Swoyer says about this very interesting view! He only cites Cocchiarella 1986 Ch.3. The view leaves a lot of work to be done in explaining how nature is, and how our concepts connect to it, and arise in response to it.

The 19 ideas from 'Properties'

10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]