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Single Idea 10405
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
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Full Idea
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy.
Clarification
In 'iteration', each one generates the next one
Gist of Idea
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
Source
Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.16
The
19 ideas
from 'Properties'
10399
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If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal
[Swoyer]
|
10400
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Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties
[Swoyer]
|
10401
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The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations
[Swoyer]
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10403
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If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract
[Swoyer]
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10402
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Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
[Swoyer]
|
10404
|
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything
[Swoyer]
|
10405
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In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
[Swoyer]
|
10406
|
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
[Swoyer]
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10408
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Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression
[Swoyer]
|
10409
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Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples
[Swoyer]
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10412
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If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction
[Swoyer]
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10411
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Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers
[Swoyer]
|
10407
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Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences
[Swoyer]
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10410
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Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance
[Swoyer]
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10413
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The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
[Swoyer]
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10416
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Can properties have parts?
[Swoyer]
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10417
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There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
[Swoyer]
|
10421
|
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic
[Swoyer]
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10420
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Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
[Swoyer]
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