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Single Idea 10409

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars ]

Full Idea

Recent empirical work on concepts says that many concepts have graded membership, and stress the importance of phenomena like typicality, prototypes, and exemplars.

Gist of Idea

Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.25

A Reaction

[He cites Rorsch 1978 as the start of this] I say the mind is a database, exactly corresponding to tables, fields etc. Prototypes sound good as the way we identify a given category. Universals are the 'typical' examples labelling areas (e.g. goat).

The 23 ideas from Chris Swoyer

14592 Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
14593 Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
14595 Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
14594 Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]