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Single Idea 10410

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism ]

Full Idea

Anti-realists theories of measurement (like operationalism) cannot explain how we can use different methods to measure the same thing (e.g. lengths and distances in cosmology, geology, histology and atomic physics).

Clarification

'Histology' studies microscopic biological structures

Gist of Idea

Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.28


A Reaction

Swoyer says that the explanation is that measurement aims at objective properties, the same in each of these areas. Quite good.


The 19 ideas from 'Properties'

If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]