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Single Idea 10413

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness.

Gist of Idea

The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 6)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.41


A Reaction

The necessity (in all possible worlds) covers renates and cordates. It is hard to see how one could assert the necessity without some deeper explanation. What makes us deny that actually coextensive renates and cordates have different properties?


The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]