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Single Idea 10417

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties ]

Full Idea

'Elementarism' is the view that there are first-order properties, but that there are no properties of any higher-order. There are first-order properties like various shades of red, but there is no higher-order property, like 'being a colour'.

Gist of Idea

There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 7.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.44

A Reaction

[He cites Bergmann 1968] Interesting. Presumably the programme is naturalistic (and hence congenial to me), and generalisations about properties are conceptual, while the properties themselves are natural.

The 23 ideas from Chris Swoyer

14592 Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
14593 Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
14595 Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
14594 Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]