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Single Idea 10417

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties ]

Full Idea

'Elementarism' is the view that there are first-order properties, but that there are no properties of any higher-order. There are first-order properties like various shades of red, but there is no higher-order property, like 'being a colour'.

Gist of Idea

There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')

Source

Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 7.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.44

A Reaction

[He cites Bergmann 1968] Interesting. Presumably the programme is naturalistic (and hence congenial to me), and generalisations about properties are conceptual, while the properties themselves are natural.

The 19 ideas from 'Properties'

10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]