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Single Idea 10426
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
]
Full Idea
A name has got to name something or it is not a name.
Gist of Idea
A name has got to name something or it is not a name
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 66th pg), quoted by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.399
A Reaction
This seems to be stipulative, since most people would say that a list of potential names for a baby counted as names. It may be wrong. There are fictional names, or mistakes.
The
32 ideas
from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'
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18348
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Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers
[Russell, by Rami]
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21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions)
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
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19051
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Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data
[Russell, by Quine]
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7744
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Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions
[Russell, by McCullogh]
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5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states
[Russell, by Ellis]
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18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts
[Russell, by Armstrong]
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6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
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21702
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In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
[Russell, by Quine]
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9022
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Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes
[Quine on Russell]
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6091
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Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
[Russell]
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6090
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Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences
[Russell]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis
[Russell]
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6092
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In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object
[Russell]
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6093
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The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared
[Russell]
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6094
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An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
[Russell]
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6095
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The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
[Russell]
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6096
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I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods
[Russell]
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6097
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The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent
[Russell]
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6098
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Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition
[Russell]
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6099
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Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions
[Russell]
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6100
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Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts
[Russell]
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6101
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Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'
[Russell]
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6102
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You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
[Russell]
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6119
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You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name
[Russell]
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6103
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Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical
[Russell]
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6106
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Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely
[Russell]
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality
[Russell]
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6104
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Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions
[Russell]
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10423
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There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
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10426
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A name has got to name something or it is not a name
[Russell]
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21712
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I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday
[Russell]
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21709
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You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert
[Russell]
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