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Single Idea 10433
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
]
Full Idea
Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences.
Gist of Idea
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.411
A Reaction
The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail.
Related Idea
Idea 7754
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[descriptions which seem to pick out a unique item]:
13733
|
Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms
[Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
6411
|
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
|
10433
|
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
18779
|
'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation
[Montague]
|
5811
|
A definite description can have a non-referential use
[Donnellan]
|
5812
|
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out
[Donnellan]
|
5814
|
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence
[Donnellan]
|
13814
|
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer
[Bostock]
|
13816
|
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers
[Bostock]
|
13817
|
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer
[Bostock]
|
13813
|
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors
[Bostock]
|
13848
|
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope
[Bostock]
|
10444
|
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential
[Bach]
|
10425
|
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer
[Sainsbury]
|
10438
|
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position
[Sainsbury]
|
13398
|
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
[Jubien]
|
15414
|
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid
[Burgess]
|
18774
|
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure
[Linsky,B]
|
9454
|
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's
[Bealer]
|
10671
|
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description
[Hossack]
|