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Single Idea 10433

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences.

Gist of Idea

Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.411


A Reaction

The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail.

Related Idea

Idea 7754 Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]


The 46 ideas from 'On Denoting'

Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]