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Single Idea 10446
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
]
Full Idea
We must distinguish 'reference' in a fiction from reference outside the fiction to fictional entities.
Gist of Idea
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction
Source
Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.534
A Reaction
This may be more semantically than ontologically significant. It is perhaps best explicated by Coleridge's distinction over whether or not I am 'suspending my disbelief' when I am discussing a character.
The
21 ideas
from 'What Does It Take to Refer?'
10440
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An object can be described without being referred to
[Bach]
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10439
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What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives?
[Bach]
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10441
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If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
[Bach]
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10446
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Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction
[Bach]
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10447
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We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects
[Bach]
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10442
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We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description
[Bach]
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10443
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You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague
[Bach]
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10444
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Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential
[Bach]
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10445
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It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description
[Bach]
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10455
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Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence
[Bach]
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10453
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In logic constants play the role of proper names
[Bach]
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10454
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In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence
[Bach]
|
10452
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Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses
[Bach]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
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10457
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Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential
[Bach]
|
10459
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Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit
[Bach]
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10460
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'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group
[Bach]
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10458
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People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination
[Bach]
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10461
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What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions
[Bach]
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10462
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Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance
[Bach]
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10463
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Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it
[Bach]
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