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Single Idea 10446

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories ]

Full Idea

We must distinguish 'reference' in a fiction from reference outside the fiction to fictional entities.

Gist of Idea

Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction

Source

Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.534


A Reaction

This may be more semantically than ontologically significant. It is perhaps best explicated by Coleridge's distinction over whether or not I am 'suspending my disbelief' when I am discussing a character.


The 21 ideas from 'What Does It Take to Refer?'

An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]