more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 10456
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
]
Full Idea
The familiar problems with the Millian view of names are the problem of positive and negative existential statements, empty names, identity sentences, and propositional attitude ascription.
Gist of Idea
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
Source
Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.538
A Reaction
I take this combination of problems to make an overwhelming case against the daft idea that the semantics of a name amounts to the actual object it picks out. It is a category mistake to attempt to insert a person into a sentence.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[names do no more than pick out an object]:
|
13789
|
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing
[Plato]
|
|
4944
|
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation
[Mill, by Kripke]
|
|
7762
|
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object
[Mill, by Lycan]
|
|
4978
|
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
|
|
6410
|
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
|
10449
|
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
|
|
15159
|
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
|
|
10823
|
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
|
|
7089
|
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
21879
|
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
[Derrida]
|
|
9171
|
The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
|
|
10428
|
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
|
8957
|
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
|
|
4959
|
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
|
|
16982
|
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
|
|
9041
|
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
|
|
16405
|
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
|
|
10456
|
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
|
|
13399
|
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
|
|
7306
|
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
[Miller,A]
|
|
21653
|
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
|
|
18945
|
Millians say a name just means its object
[Sawyer]
|