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Single Idea 10485

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets ]

Full Idea

The naïve view of set theory (that any zero or more things form a set) is natural, but inconsistent: the things that do not belong to themselves are some things that do not form a set.

Gist of Idea

Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves

Source

George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.127)

Book Ref

Boolos,George: 'Logic, Logic and Logic' [Harvard 1999], p.127


A Reaction

As clear a summary of Russell's Paradox as you could ever hope for.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [sets as defined by absolutely any concept]:

Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine]
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]