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Single Idea 10516

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference ]

Full Idea

Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects.

Gist of Idea

A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects

Source

report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II

A Reaction

An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [reference fixed by a causal link to something]:

4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
5822 The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
17033 We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
3209 Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
3210 If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
9547 Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
18612 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]