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Single Idea 10529

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle ]

Full Idea

Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.

Clarification

Hume's Principle defines 'equinumerous' by one-to-one mapping

Gist of Idea

If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth

Source

Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Studies' [-], p.310


A Reaction

This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [view that one-one correspondence is basis of numbers]:

Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS]
Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter]
Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck]
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock]
There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock]
Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock]
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]