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Single Idea 10533

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals ]

Full Idea

Frege is denying that on a traditional basis we can construct a workable semantics for a language; we can't regard terms like 'wisdom' as standing for the very same thing as the predicate 'x is wise' stands for.

Gist of Idea

We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.472

A Reaction

This follows from Idea 10532, indicating how to deal with the problem of universals. So predicates refer to concepts, and singular terms to objects. But I see no authoritative way of deciding which is which, given that paraphrases are possible.

Related Idea

Idea 10532 We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]

The 33 ideas from 'On Sense and Reference'

8187 Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
18772 We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
14075 Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
10510 Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
18937 If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
10424 A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
9462 Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
18936 Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
10533 We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
4893 Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
22318 Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
15597 Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
17002 Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
18778 Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
7805 Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
15155 Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
11126 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
8164 Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
9817 Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
8171 Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
4954 Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
9180 Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
7304 Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
18773 People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
4976 The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
4977 In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
4979 We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
4980 The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
4981 The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
18940 It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
18939 In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]