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Single Idea 10533
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
]
Full Idea
Frege is denying that on a traditional basis we can construct a workable semantics for a language; we can't regard terms like 'wisdom' as standing for the very same thing as the predicate 'x is wise' stands for.
Gist of Idea
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.472
A Reaction
This follows from Idea 10532, indicating how to deal with the problem of universals. So predicates refer to concepts, and singular terms to objects. But I see no authoritative way of deciding which is which, given that paraphrases are possible.
Related Idea
Idea 10532
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
The
33 ideas
from 'On Sense and Reference'
11126
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'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent
[Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
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8164
|
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
9817
|
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
8171
|
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
15597
|
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference
[Frege, by Fine,K]
|
17002
|
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference
[Kripke on Frege]
|
18778
|
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference
[Frege]
|
7805
|
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
|
10533
|
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
4893
|
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
[Frege, by Perry]
|
18752
|
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
[Frege, by McGee]
|
22318
|
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent
[Frege, by Potter]
|
9180
|
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
15155
|
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves
[Frege, by Soames]
|
4954
|
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined
[Kripke on Frege]
|
8187
|
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
[Frege, by Dummett]
|
18772
|
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name
[Frege]
|
18937
|
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way
[Frege, by Sawyer]
|
14075
|
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense
[Frege, by Gibbard]
|
10424
|
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept
[Frege, by Sainsbury]
|
10510
|
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms
[Frege, by Hale]
|
9462
|
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first
[Frege, by Jacquette]
|
18936
|
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense'
[Frege, by Sawyer]
|
7304
|
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
18773
|
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'
[Frege]
|
4976
|
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense
[Frege]
|
4977
|
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference
[Frege]
|
4978
|
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
|
4979
|
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth
[Frege]
|
4980
|
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false
[Frege]
|
4981
|
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence
[Frege]
|
18940
|
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names
[Frege]
|
18939
|
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object
[Frege]
|