more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 10546

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete ]

Full Idea

There is no reason for wanting a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract objects.

Gist of Idea

We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction

Source

Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.494


A Reaction

This rather depends on your ontology. If you are happy for reality to be full of weird non-physical entities, then the blurring won't bother you. If the boundary is blurred but still real, it is a very interesting one.


The 23 ideas from 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)'

If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]