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Single Idea 10551

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero ]

Full Idea

On Frege's approach (of accepting abstract objects if they fall under a concept) the existence of the number 0, from which the series of numbers starts, is of course guaranteed by the citation of a concept under which nothing falls.

Gist of Idea

If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.504


A Reaction

Frege cites the set of all non-self-identical objects, but he could have cited the set of circular squares. Given his Russell Paradox problems, this whole claim is thrown in doubt. Actually doesn't Frege's view make 0 impossible? Am I missing something?


The 7 ideas with the same theme [status and nature of the number zero]:

Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett]
For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara]
If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett]
Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege]
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]