more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 10565

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets ]

Full Idea

There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated, since the set of all those sets which have been generated at a given stage will itself give us something new.

Gist of Idea

There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated

Source

Kit Fine (Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], 1)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Studies' [-], p.372


The 15 ideas with the same theme [sets as a well-founded hierarchy built from scratch]:

The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry]
There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy]
Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro]
It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro]
Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro]
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
The iterative conception of set wasn't suggested until 1947 [Lavine]
The iterative conception needs the Axiom of Infinity, to show how far we can iterate [Lavine]
The iterative conception doesn't unify the axioms, and has had little impact on mathematical proofs [Lavine]
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]