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Single Idea 10620

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth ]

Full Idea

At that time (c.1930) a concept of objective mathematical truth as opposed to demonstrability was viewed with greatest suspicion and widely rejected as meaningless.

Gist of Idea

Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted

Source

Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 28.2

Book Ref

Smith,Peter: 'An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems' [CUP 2007], p.254


A Reaction

[quoted from a letter] This is the time of Ramsey's redundancy account, and before Tarski's famous paper of 1933. It is also the high point of Formalism, associated with Hilbert.


The 6 ideas with the same theme [role of truth in various systems of formal logic]:

There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant]
Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]