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Full Idea
The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary.
Gist of Idea
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets
Source
Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.15
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |