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Full Idea
Frege claims that second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, just as singular first-order quantifiers are committed to objects.
Gist of Idea
Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification 5.3
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.18
A Reaction
It increasingly strikes me that Fregeans try to get away with this nonsense by diluting both the notion of a 'concept' and the notion of an 'object'.
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| 10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
| 10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |