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Single Idea 10643
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
]
Full Idea
Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'.
Gist of Idea
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments'
Source
Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.20
A Reaction
This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma.
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[nature of existence commitments]:
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10784
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Whenever there's speech it has to be about something
[Plato]
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13879
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For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures
[Frege, by Wright,C]
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6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
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13938
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A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question
[Carnap]
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19485
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Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
[Quine]
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11101
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General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
[Quine]
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8496
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What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
[Quine]
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10667
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A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
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15785
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Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system
[Hintikka]
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10548
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The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence'
[Dummett]
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10281
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The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language
[Dummett]
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18211
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You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
[Field,H]
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12226
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The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence
[Hale/Wright]
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7678
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Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
[Jacquette]
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8258
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Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
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12449
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Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences
[Azzouni]
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10643
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We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments'
[Linnebo]
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10668
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We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle
[Hossack]
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14491
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Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
[Thomasson]
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18770
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We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being
[Anderson,CA]
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