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Single Idea 10679

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

'Sortalism' endorses the view that some things have parts, but denies that every collection of things composes something. Whenever there is a particular, there must be a sort or kind to which it belongs.

Gist of Idea

'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind

Source

report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 7

Book Ref

-: 'British Soc for the Philosophy of Science' [-], p.427

A Reaction

What is the status of 'the first of its kind'? This seems to say that a token only has identity if it has type-identity. This sounds wildly wrong to me. I've made a 'thing' for you, but I haven't decided what it is yet.

The 40 ideas with the same theme [picking out things by giving their kind]:

12351 Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
16156 Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
12280 Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
12529 I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
15834 Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
16501 In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
16506 Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
13868 Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
14745 If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
12860 Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]