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Single Idea 10679
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
]
Full Idea
'Sortalism' endorses the view that some things have parts, but denies that every collection of things composes something. Whenever there is a particular, there must be a sort or kind to which it belongs.
Gist of Idea
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
Source
report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 7
Book Ref
-: 'British Soc for the Philosophy of Science' [-], p.427
A Reaction
What is the status of 'the first of its kind'? This seems to say that a token only has identity if it has type-identity. This sounds wildly wrong to me. I've made a 'thing' for you, but I haven't decided what it is yet.
The
83 ideas
from David Wiggins
13128
|
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories
[Westerhoff on Wiggins]
|
11896
|
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
15835
|
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
11900
|
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims
[Mackie,P on Wiggins]
|
10679
|
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
[Wiggins, by Hossack]
|
14363
|
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14364
|
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14744
|
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14746
|
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal
[Sider on Wiggins]
|
14749
|
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times
[Wiggins, by Sider]
|
14362
|
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
11831
|
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11832
|
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
[Wiggins]
|
11836
|
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
[Wiggins]
|
11838
|
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
[Wiggins]
|
11839
|
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
[Wiggins]
|
11847
|
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
[Wiggins]
|
11848
|
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
[Wiggins]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11841
|
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
[Wiggins]
|
11850
|
Not every story corresponds to a possible world
[Wiggins]
|
11844
|
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
[Wiggins]
|
11851
|
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
[Wiggins]
|
11852
|
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
[Wiggins]
|
11845
|
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
[Wiggins]
|
11858
|
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
[Wiggins]
|
11859
|
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
[Wiggins]
|
11860
|
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds
[Wiggins]
|
11869
|
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
[Wiggins]
|
11870
|
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
[Wiggins]
|
11861
|
We can forget about individual or particularized essences
[Wiggins]
|
11863
|
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
11865
|
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
[Wiggins]
|
11866
|
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
[Wiggins]
|
11871
|
Essences are not explanations, but individuations
[Wiggins]
|
11875
|
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
[Wiggins]
|
11876
|
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
[Wiggins]
|
11879
|
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F)
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
11835
|
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
[Wiggins]
|
16492
|
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out
[Wiggins]
|
16493
|
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers
[Wiggins]
|
16496
|
Singling out extends back and forward in time
[Wiggins]
|
16495
|
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something
[Wiggins]
|
16494
|
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative
[Wiggins]
|
17529
|
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting
[Wiggins]
|
16497
|
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity
[Wiggins]
|
16498
|
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities
[Wiggins]
|
16499
|
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork'
[Wiggins]
|
16503
|
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing
[Wiggins]
|
16502
|
Identity is primitive
[Wiggins]
|
16501
|
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is
[Wiggins]
|
16505
|
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself!
[Wiggins]
|
16506
|
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence
[Wiggins]
|
17530
|
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting
[Wiggins]
|
16510
|
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual
[Wiggins]
|
16509
|
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances
[Wiggins]
|
16511
|
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')
[Wiggins]
|
16512
|
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction
[Wiggins]
|
16515
|
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed
[Wiggins]
|
16517
|
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction
[Wiggins]
|
16514
|
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function
[Wiggins]
|
16518
|
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us
[Wiggins]
|
16521
|
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A
[Wiggins]
|
16522
|
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human
[Wiggins]
|
16523
|
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts
[Wiggins]
|
16524
|
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality
[Wiggins]
|
16525
|
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience
[Wiggins]
|
16526
|
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed….
[Wiggins]
|
12057
|
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be
[Wiggins]
|
12047
|
We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding
[Wiggins]
|
12056
|
An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect
[Wiggins]
|
12055
|
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?'
[Wiggins]
|
12059
|
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river
[Wiggins]
|
12063
|
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals
[Wiggins]
|
12064
|
The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology
[Wiggins]
|
12065
|
Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation
[Wiggins]
|
12049
|
Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information
[Wiggins]
|
12050
|
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity
[Wiggins]
|
12051
|
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances
[Wiggins]
|
12053
|
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees
[Wiggins]
|
12054
|
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations
[Wiggins]
|
12052
|
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other'
[Wiggins]
|