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Single Idea 10679

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

'Sortalism' endorses the view that some things have parts, but denies that every collection of things composes something. Whenever there is a particular, there must be a sort or kind to which it belongs.

Gist of Idea

'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind

Source

report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 7

Book Ref

-: 'British Soc for the Philosophy of Science' [-], p.427

A Reaction

What is the status of 'the first of its kind'? This seems to say that a token only has identity if it has type-identity. This sounds wildly wrong to me. I've made a 'thing' for you, but I haven't decided what it is yet.

The 39 ideas from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'

14746 What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11848 Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
11850 Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
11859 The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
11860 Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
11869 Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
11863 (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]