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Single Idea 10694

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |= ]

Full Idea

Tarski's 1936 definition of logical consequence is that in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true too (so that no model can make the conclusion false).

Gist of Idea

Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true

Source

report of Alfred Tarski (works [1936]) by JC Beall / G Restall - Logical Consequence 3

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.6


A Reaction

So the general idea is that a logical consequence is distinguished by being unstoppable. Sounds good. But then we have monotonic and non-monotonic logics, which (I'm guessing) embody different notions of consequence.


The 6 ideas from 'works'

In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]